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Although it is well known that exposure to misinformation after an event can alter
memory, less known are the effects of being presented with different amounts of
misinformation. The present study examined (a) how exposure to different amounts of
misinformation affects memory, (b) how sensitively individuals monitor the accuracy
of a (mis)information source, (c) whether perceived credibility of the misinformation
source mediates the relations between misinformation exposure and memory accuracy,
(d) whether perceived source credibility is associated with improved source monitoring,
and (e) how exposure to different amounts of misinformation affects the ability to
accurately assess one’s own memory performance. Participants watched a mock crime
video, were exposed to a misleading narrative about the video containing 20%, 50%,
or 80% misinformation, completed a memory test, and rated the credibility of the
misinformation source and their own memory performance. Receiving more misinfor-
mation decreased memory accuracy. Interestingly, receiving more misinformation also
led subjects to become more skeptical of the credibility of the narrative, dampening the
negative effect of misinformation on memory accuracy. In addition, individuals’
perceptions of the source’s credibility and source monitoring accuracy were negatively
associated. Lastly, participants’ performance estimates and confidence were well cal-
ibrated to their actual performance, except when they were misled, supporting the idea
that misinformed responses are more difficult to monitor. Participants also tended to
overestimate their accuracy, particularly when they performed poorly.
Keywords: misinformation, source credibility, memory accuracy, metacognition
Memory is a constant restructuring process,
one that consists of incorporating new informa-
tion into old memories and interpreting new
information in light of what is already known
(see Clifasefi, Garry, & Loftus, 2007; Schacter,
2001, for reviews). Researchers have reported
that this restructuring process can result in
memory errors when the new information pre-
sented is incorrect (Belli, 1989; Dodd & Brad-
shaw, 1980; Loftus, 1975; Loftus, 1979). These
findings have led to further explorations of the
processes that may be at play within the misin-
formation effect in efforts to provide possible
explanations as to why individuals incorporate
postevent misinformation into memory. Under-
standing the cognitive and metacognitive as-
pects of memory, such as the ability to monitor
postevent information for accuracy, to accu-
rately distinguish an experienced memory from
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postevent misinformation, and to correctly as-
sess one’s own memory performance, has im-
portant implications for our theoretical under-
standing of how the misinformation effect
occurs.
In the present study, we examined contextual
and individual difference effects on resistance to
false information provided after exposure to a
mock crime. Specifically, we explored (a) whether
increasing the proportion of misinformation to
neutral information negatively impacts memory
accuracy, (b) how sensitively individuals monitor
the accuracy of a (mis)information source, (c)
whether perceived credibility of the misinforma-
tion source mediates the relations between misin-
formation exposure and memory accuracy, (d)
whether perceived source credibility leads to im-
proved source monitoring, and (e) the accuracy of
participants’ self- evaluations of memory perfor-
mance. By collectively examining these issues,
the present study was designed to provide addi-
tional support for the negative impact of misinfor-
mation on memory accuracy, but more impor-
tantly, the design allowed for the investigation of
factors (perceived source credibility, source mon-
itoring accuracy) that may be heightened in the
face of high rates of misinformation and aid in the
resistance to that misinformation. Further, we
were able to determine how effectively partici-
pants are able to monitor their memory perfor-
mance when misinformed.
Misinformation and Memory Performance
Provision of false information between a to-
be-remembered event and recall of that event is
a common source of memory error (Loftus &
Hoffman, 1989). The misinformation effect has
the potential to influence memory of an original
event, which can lead to decreased accuracy at
recall (Belli, 1989; Loftus & Hoffman, 1989;
Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Weingardt, Lof-
tus, & Lindsay, 1995). One cognitive explana-
tion for the misinformation effect is suggested
by the source-monitoring framework (Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), which claims
that every memory, including memory for mis-
information, has a source, which is evaluated by
the individual at the time of retrieval. Some-
times misinformation is recalled instead of what
was actually witnessed simply because the
source of the misinformation is confused as
being from the original event, an error referred
to as a source misattribution error (Belli, Lind-
say, Gales, & McCarthy, 1994; Zaragoza &
Lane, 1994). In line with an integrated model of
the misinformation effect, research suggests
that source monitoring is a cognitive process
that can be affected by social factors such as the
perceived credibility of the postevent source
(Skagerberg & Wright, 2009).
Source Credibility and
Memory Performance
People who are given warnings about the
credibility of the source of postevent informa-
tion (e.g., that the source is not credible, or that
the source is someone who may have motiva-
tion to deceive) scrutinize the features of the
source more than those who are not given a
warning. This additional scrutiny allows the
warned group to more effectively monitor their
memories and to dismiss misleading items (e.g.,
Echterhoff, Hirst, & Hussy, 2005; Frost, Ingra-
ham, & Wilson, 2002; Skagerberg & Wright,
2009). However, although research suggests
that individuals are capable of making credibil-
ity judgments from implicit warnings (e.g., the
source is the driver who caused the accident
being described), it is less clear whether indi-
viduals are able to make such judgments based
solely on the content of postevent misinforma-
tion without alluding to any specific character-
istic of the source that may affect credibility
judgments. It is important to examine cues to
credibility that are intrinsic to the actual quality
of the information received, as they are in many
cases in the real world.
Discrepancy Detection and
Memory Performance
Existing literature on the principle of discrep-
ancy detection, proposed by Tousignant, Hall,
and Loftus (1986), suggests that individuals
may be capable of accurately assessing the (in-
)accuracy of postevent narratives containing
misinformation without any cues other than the
content of the narrative. When individuals are
able to detect discrepancies between an event
and postevent misinformation, they are better
able to reject misinformation (Tousignant et al.,
1986). For example, increasing suggestive de-
tails may actually inhibit children from devel-
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oping images to false memories because they
are more likely to detect the discrepancies (Ot-
gaar, Candel, Scoboria, & Merckelbach, 2010).
In addition, Loftus (1979) found that providing
individuals with blatant misinformation made
them more resistant to misinformation. In the
present study, we examined whether increasing
the proportion of misinformation to neutral in-
formation in a postevent narrative would in-
crease discrepancy detection by offering more
opportunities to note discrepancies. To our
knowledge, the present study is the first to in-
vestigate whether individuals can correctly as-
sess the (in)accuracy of postevent narratives
varying in the degree of misinformation without
any previous experience with the information
source or any blatant credibility cues.
Metacognition and Memory Performance
Metacognition may also play an important
role in explaining the misinformation effect.
Specifically, the metacognitive concept of feel-
ing of knowing (FOK) refers to a self-prediction
regarding performance on a knowledge-based
task, which may affect what an individual re-
ports when asked to recall an event. Previous
research investigating the relation between an
individual’s FOK and actual performance on an
exam demonstrates a tendency to overestimate
one’s performance and abilities (Falchikov &
Boud, 1989). For example, Fischhoff, Slovic,
and Lichtenstein (1977) found that when partic-
ipants were given general-knowledge questions
and subsequently asked to rate how confident
they were in their responses, they were consis-
tently overconfident in their responses. How-
ever, the majority of this research has focused
on calibrating accuracy and confidence in terms
of knowledge-based tasks in learning contexts
(See Schwartz, 1994 for review). Less is known
about whether individuals exhibit the same ten-
dency to overestimate on tasks geared more
toward memory accuracy.
Additionally, some research has examined
the differences between misinformed and con-
trol subjects on their accuracy-confidence cali-
bration (Tomes & Katz, 2000; Weingardt, Leo-
nesio, & Loftus, 1994). For example, Weingardt
and colleagues found that individuals who were
misled endorsed greater confidence in their in-
correct responses compared with those individ-
uals who were not misled: Individuals who re-
ceived misinformation experienced a high FOK
when presented with a misinformation response
option and therefore reported a high confidence
judgment when choosing the misinformation re-
sponse compared with individuals who chose the
misled response but never received it. The present
study aimed to address the relations between con-
fidence judgments and accuracy performance by
examining how confidence ratings differed among
different types of responses (i.e., correct, incor-
rect, and misinformed responses) and how global
performance estimates varied by actual perfor-
mance.
Overview of the Present Study
We addressed the relations among misinfor-
mation, perceived source credibility, and mem-
ory accuracy. Participants watched a video of a
mock crime and then received a misleading
written narrative containing low (20%), me-
dium (50%), or high (80%) proportions of mis-
information. Participants then completed a
memory test related to the video and answered
questions regarding the narrative’s credibility
and their performance on the memory ques-
tions. This between-subjects design allowed us
to test direct relations between amount of mis-
information and memory accuracy, as well as
the mediational effect of perceived credibility
and relations with source monitoring accuracy.
We were also able to examine whether individ-
uals are capable of accurately estimating their
performance and the effect of receiving differ-
ent quantities of misinformation on the calibra-
tion of performance estimates and confidence
with respect to actual performance.
We hypothesized that individuals exposed to
larger proportions of misinformation would an-
swer a smaller proportion of questions regard-
ing misinformation items correctly and a larger
proportion of those questions in line with the
misinformation compared with individuals ex-
posed to smaller proportions of misinformation.
Our second hypothesis was that as misleading
information increased in proportion to nonmis-
leading information, participants would per-
ceive the source as less credible. Relatedly, we
hypothesized that this change in perceived
source credibility would mediate the relations
between misinformation exposure and memory
accuracy. Specifically, based on discrepancy
detection literature, we hypothesized that a de-
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crease in perceived credibility would result in a
dampening of the misinformation effect.
Fourth, based on the source monitoring view of
misinformation resistance (Chambers & Zara-
goza, 2001; Echterhoff et al., 2005), we hypoth-
esized that perceived source credibility and
source monitoring accuracy would be associ-
ated. Finally, we hypothesized that participants
would overestimate their performance on the
memory questions, especially if they were highly
inaccurate, based on past research showing indi-
viduals’ tendency to overestimate their perfor-
mance, particularly if they are low performing
(Falchikov & Boud, 1989).
Method
Participants
The participants were 142 students at a large
southeastern university who were recruited via
the university’s psychology research participa-
tion system in exchange for course credit. Of
these participants, six were excluded because of
a recording equipment malfunction, six because
they answered the attention-check question in-
correctly, and three because they decided they
did not want their data to be used. The final
sample of 127 participants was 69% female
(N  88) and representative of the community
from which they were drawn (65% Hispanic,
15% African American, 11% Caucasian, 4%
Asian American, and 5% other). They ranged in
age from 18 to 39 years (M  21.21, SD 
3.28).
Materials and Procedure
Participants completed all study procedures
via an online survey on individual computers in
a computer lab on campus. As many as 12
participants were tested per session. Online con-
sent and all study procedures were administered
via the Qualtrics survey program and study par-
ticipation lasted 60 to 80 min.
Mock crime video. After providing online
consent, participants viewed a brief (six and a
half minute) silent video of a mock crime,
which has been successfully used in previous
related research (e.g., Takarangi, Parker, &
Garry, 2006). The video depicts an electrician
who enters a house to fix various items such as
the oven and a light fixture, but while doing so
he also rummages through the owner’s personal
belongings and steals some of their possessions,
such as a pair of earrings and a compact disk.
After viewing the video, participants were taken
to a new survey page and were given a 12-min
filler task in which they were asked to answer
trivia questions. Once the 12 min expired, they
were automatically advanced to the next section
of the study where they received further instruc-
tions.
Misleading narrative. Participants were
informed that a previous set of participants had
written brief narratives about the robbery de-
picted in the video and that one of those narra-
tives would be presented to them to refresh their
memory. They were shown a photograph and
basic demographic information about the al-
leged participant whose narrative they were
reading. This “previous participant” was actu-
ally an artificial profile composed of a randomly
selected head shot chosen from a sample of
eight, which was retrieved via a publically
available online database of faces. Participants
were also presented with artificially created de-
mographic information for the eight profiles
designed to loosely match the demographics of
the population from which the sample was
drawn: 21 year-old Caucasian male, 20 year-old
Caucasian male, 21 year-old Hispanic male, 20
year-old Hispanic male, 21 year-old Caucasian
female, 20 year-old Caucasian female, 21 year-
old Hispanic female, and 20 year-old Hispanic
female. The goal was to create believable pro-
files of information sources (alleged previous
participants) that participants could later evalu-
ate for credibility. To gauge whether partici-
pants believed that a previous participant had
actually written the narrative, at the conclusion
of the study they were asked, “Did you suspect
that the profile and narrative you read were
created by the research team instead of another
participant? If so, what made you suspect?”
Participants were randomly assigned to re-
ceive a narrative with a low (20%), medium
(50%), or high (80%) proportion of misleading
information. Each narrative was composed of a
total of 40 sentences and so those in the 20%
condition received a narrative with eight mis-
leading sentences, the 50% condition received a
narrative with 20 misleading sentences, and the
80% condition received a narrative with 32 mis-
leading sentences. The misleading sentences
were randomized so that the specific sentences
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that contained misleading information varied
across participants even within the same condi-
tion. The pieces of misleading information were
changes made to details about objects seen in
the video; information was not added. The non-
misleading sentences were neutral to avoid
strengthening the participant’s memory trace
for the target items. For example, a misleading
item was “He noticed the dresser was covered
with a brown cloth” and the neutral version of
that item was “He noticed the dresser was cov-
ered with a cloth.” Each of the 40 sentences was
displayed to the participants one at a time.
There was no time restriction per line so that the
participants could take however much time they
needed to read each sentence. After reading the
entire narrative, participants completed a 5-min
filler math test. After this, participants were
automatically advanced to a new page where
they answered questions about the mock crime
video.
Memory questions. All participants were
asked the same set of 40 three-option forced-
choice questions about the mock crime video
(e.g., Eric noticed that the dresser was covered
with a cloth) in random order. For each memory
question, participants could choose the correct
answer, meaning, the option corresponding to
what was actually portrayed in the video (e.g.,
navy), an incorrect answer that for some partic-
ipants reflected a piece of misinformation pro-
vided in the narrative (e.g., brown), or an incor-
rect answer, corresponding to information that
was not portrayed to any of the participants in
the video or the narrative (e.g., yellow). The
response choices were presented simultane-
ously with the order randomized. For each item
participants were subsequently asked how con-
fident they were of their answer, from one,
meaning not very confident, to five, meaning
very confident. Finally, after each item they
were also asked the source of their answer (i.e.,
the video, the narrative, both, or neither). Par-
ticipants were also asked an attention-check
question to ensure that they actually read each
sentence from the narrative presented to them.
The attention-check question asked, “What is
the answer?” to which they were instructed
while reading the narrative to answer, “potato
chips.”
Because participants were exposed to differ-
ing amounts of misinformation, they also dif-
fered in the number of memory questions to
which they could provide a misinformed re-
sponse. We refer to these questions as “misin-
formation questions.” To account for varying
exposure to misinformation, we calculated the
proportions of correct, incorrect, and mislead
responses to misinformation questions for each
participant. The denominator for each propor-
tion score was the total number of misinforma-
tion questions asked. We used these proportion
scores as our memory variables in all relevant
analyses. For example, a participant in the 20%
misinformation condition who answered six
misinformation questions correctly would re-
ceive a proportion correct score of 6/8  .75,
whereas a participant in the 80% misinforma-
tion condition who similarly answered 6 misin-
formation questions correctly would receive a
proportion correct score of 6/32  .19.
Questionnaire. Following the questions
about the mock crime video, participants were
given a 28-item questionnaire. The question-
naire examined the participant’s metacognition
and perceived source credibility. Participants
were first asked questions concerning their cog-
nitive monitoring, which is the online monitor-
ing of one’s own cognitive processes. Specifi-
cally, participants were asked four questions
about the strength of their memories (e.g.,
“How good is your memory for the video you
just watched?”). All questions were answered
on a 5-point Likert scale with lower numbers
indicating weaker memory strength and higher
numbers indicating stronger memory strength.
These four items reached an acceptable level of
consistency (Cronbach’s   .73) and thus
were averaged to create a memory strength vari-
able. Participants were asked an additional three
cognitive monitoring questions specifically
aimed to gauge how well they thought they did
on the memory questionnaire (e.g., “How many
questions do you think you got wrong?”). Par-
ticipants’ answers to these cognitive monitoring
questions were then directly compared to their
actual performance.
Participants were then questioned about the
credibility of the (mis)information source (e.g.,
“How good was the quality of the narrative?”
“How familiar is the other participant with the
video?”). Specifically, participants answered
eight questions concerning the perceived credi-
bility of the narrative and narrator on a 5-point
Likert scale with lower numbers indicating
lower credibility and higher numbers indicating
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higher credibility. The eight items were consis-
tent (Cronbach’s   .83) and were averaged to
create a perceived credibility variable. These
items included helpfulness, quality, (in)accuracy,
narrator familiarity with the video, believability,
honesty, and expected memory performance if
presented with a different narrative. They were
also asked to indicate what percent of the narrative
was accurate from 0% to 100%. Lastly, partici-
pants were asked basic demographic questions.
After participants finished the questionnaire, they
were debriefed and were given the opportunity to
rewatch the video to refresh their memory.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Participants were roughly evenly distributed
across study conditions (N  39 in the high
misinformation condition, N  44 in the me-
dium misinformation condition, N  44 in the
low misinformation condition). There were no
significant differences in age, gender, ethnicity,
or year in college between the misinformation
conditions. The eight false participant profiles
were approximately evenly distributed across
conditions such that a chi-square analysis re-
vealed no significant differences in profile pre-
sentation across conditions. Approximately one
third of participants indicated that they sus-
pected the profiles to be false (35%). Interest-
ingly, of these, half suspected the profile solely
because they noted inaccuracies in the narrative
allegedly provided by the person described in
the false profile (17% of the total sample). Par-
ticipants were retained in the sample regardless
of their responses to the skepticism question
given that these responses did not vary by con-
dition, 2(6, N  127)  7.06, p  .315, and
were unrelated to the proportion of memory
questions they answered correctly, F(3, 123) 
.23, p  .873.
Next, we present analyses addressing our key
research questions. First, we examine the effects
of misinformation condition on proportions of
correct, incorrect, and misled responses to mis-
information questions. Second, we address our
primary hypothesis regarding the mediating role
of perceived source credibility in the relations
between misinformation and memory perfor-
mance via Andrew Hayes’ PROCESS tool for
SPSS (http://www.afhayes.com). Third, we
probe the links between perceived source cred-
ibility and source monitoring accuracy. Finally,
we present analyses linking perceived and ac-
tual memory performance.
Correct, Incorrect, and Misinformed
Responses by Misinformation Group
Table 1 presents means and standard devia-
tions for the proportions of correct, incorrect,
and misled responses participants provided to
misleading questions, by misinformation condi-
tion. We found (a) significant differences be-
tween conditions in the proportion of correct,
F(2, 124)  5.35, p  .006, p2  .079, and
misled responses, F(2, 124)  7.77, p  .001,
p2  .111, provided, and (b) no significant
condition effects on the proportion of incorrect
responses provided to misleading questions,
F(2, 124)  0.02, p  .984, p2  .000. Tukey’s
post hoc comparisons revealed that participants
in the 80% misinformation condition provided a
smaller proportion of correct responses and a
higher proportion of misled responses to misin-
formation items compared with participants in
the 20% misinformation condition, ps  .01.
We found no significant differences between the
50% condition and either of the other condi-
tions, ps  .05.
Source Credibility as a Mediator Between
Misinformation Group and
Memory Accuracy
Our primary research question involved the
mediating role of perceived source credibility
between receipt of misinformation and memory
accuracy, which we have defined as the propor-
tion of misleading questions answered cor-
rectly. In the first set of models, the independent
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Proportions of
Correct, Incorrect, and Misled Responses Provided
to Misleading Items, by Misinformation Condition
Misinformation condition
Response type 80% 50% 20%
Correct .63 (.13) .66 (.16) .74 (.18)
Misled .30 (.13) .26 (.14) .19 (.13)
Incorrect .07 (.05) .07 (.08) .07 (.09)
 p  .006.  p  .001.
6 PENA, KLEMFUSS, LOFTUS, AND MINDTHOFF
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
variable was misinformation condition dummy
coded to compare high versus low, in the sec-
ond set of models, misinformation condition
was dummy coded to compare medium versus
low. We found a significant indirect effect of
the high versus low misinformation condition
on the proportion of correct responses through
perceived credibility, b  .04, p  .021, bias
corrected and accelerated (BCa) 95% confi-
dence interval (CI) [.01, .09], and through esti-
mated percentage of the narrative that was cor-
rect, b  .06, p  .006, BCa 95% CI [.03, .11].
A similar pattern of effects was evident when
we compared the medium and low misinforma-
tion conditions, except that only the indirect
effect through estimated percentage of the nar-
rative that was correct was statistically signifi-
cant, b  .06, p  .007, BCa 95% CI [.02, .10].
As hypothesized, overall, exposure to a higher
proportion of misinformation was associated
with a lower proportion of correct memory re-
sponses to misinformation items, but this effect
was dampened for those participants who were
made particularly skeptical of the information
source because of high levels of misinformation
in the narrative (see Figure 1). The dampening
effect can also be seen in Table 2 in the contrast
in estimated marginal means and standard errors
when credibility estimates are controlled versus
not. These results suggest that if the 80% mis-
information group had higher credibility esti-
mates (similar to those in the 50% misinforma-
tion group), they would have performed with an
even lower proportion of correct responses to
misleading questions on average, and if the 20%
misinformation group had lower credibility es-
timates they would have performed with a
higher proportion of correct responses to mis-
leading questions.
Source-Monitoring and Memory Accuracy
Next, we examined whether skepticism about
the credibility of the misinformation narrative
was associated with source monitoring. We
coded source responses for each memory ques-
tion as accurate or inaccurate. For example, if a
participant selected a response in line with pre-
viously presented misinformation and then se-
lected the narrative as the source of their response,
the response would be coded as accurate source
monitoring. Any other response (i.e., the video,
both the video and the narrative, or neither) would
be coded as inaccurate source monitoring. Source
monitoring accuracy on individual items was av-
eraged to create a source monitoring accuracy
variable. As predicted, thinking that the narrative
was more credible and was composed of more
Table 2
Estimated Marginal Means (EMMs) and Standard
Errors of Proportions of Correct Responses to
Misinformation Questions by Condition Controlling
for, and Not Controlling for, Ratings of Credibility
and Estimates of the Percentage of the Narrative
That Was Incorrect
Control variables
included
Control variables
excluded
Condition EMM SE EMM SE
80% .59 .02 .63 .03
50% .67 .02 .66 .02
20% .77 .02 .74 .02
Note. An analysis of covariance with misinformation con-
dition predicting proportion correct, including the control
variables, was significant, F(1, 121)  15.59, p  .001,
p2  .21. All differences between misinformation condi-
tions were significant, p  .014 (80% vs. 50% condition),
p  .001 (50% vs. 20% condition), p  .001 (80% vs. 20%
condition). Analysis of variance results, without the control
variables, are presented in the text and in Table 1. Only the
80% and 20% misinformation conditions differed signifi-
cantly, p  .006.
Figure 1. Mediation model reflecting the direct effect of
the misinformation condition on the proportion of correct
responses to misinformation questions and the mediating
roles of the variables reflecting participant perceptions of
the narrative. The reported direct effects are independent of
the mediator variables. Unstandardized beta values are re-
ported.  p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
7SOURCE CREDIBILITY, MISINFORMATION, AND MEMORY
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
correct information was associated with poorer
source-monitoring accuracy, r(125)  .41, p 
.001 and r(124)  .41, p  .001.
Metacognition and Memory Performance
Participants were relatively accurate at mak-
ing global estimates of their performance on the
memory questions, except when they had been
misled. First, we compared participant esti-
mates of the number of questions they answered
correctly to the actual number of questions for
which they selected the correct, incorrect, and
misled response. Their estimates of the number
of questions they answered correctly increased
with their actual number of correct responses,
r(124)  .21, p  .019, decreased with the
number of incorrect responses, r(124)  .22,
p  .012, and had no relation with the number
of misled responses, r(124)  .02, p  .860.
Next, we calculated a difference score by sub-
tracting the number of questions participants
thought they answered correctly from the num-
ber of questions they actually answered cor-
rectly. A one-sample t test revealed that partic-
ipants tended to overestimate the number of
questions they answered correctly by about two
on average, (M  2.06, SD  7.42), t(125) 
3.12, p  .002. The accuracy of participants’
performance estimates tended to increase with
actual performance accuracy such that the ab-
solute difference between their actual perfor-
mance and estimated performance decreased as
the number of correct responses increased,
r(124)  .20, p  .023. Next, we compared
participants’ estimates of their memory strength
to the proportion of misleading items to which
they responded correctly. Mean memory
strength ratings were approximately at the cen-
ter of the 7-point scale (M  3.58, SD  .60)
and increased in line with their actual perfor-
mance, r(125)  .24, p  .007. Finally, we
assessed the accuracy of participants’ perfor-
mance estimates in terms of confidence in spe-
cific responses. An averaged confidence vari-
able was created for participants who responded
to all 40 confidence questions (102 participants
in total). Higher average confidence estimates
(M  3.85, SD  .55) were associated with a
larger proportion of correct memory responses
to misleading items, r(100)  .21, p  .038.
Conversely, confidence decreased as the pro-
portion of incorrect responses to misleading
items increased, r(100)  .45, p  .001.
There was no association between confidence
and the proportion of misled responses to mis-
leading items, r(100)  .03, p  .807.
Discussion
Previous research has demonstrated that peo-
ple are able to disregard misinformation and
more carefully monitor their memories for ac-
curacy when they have reason to believe that the
source of the misinformation lacks credibility
(Hirst & Echterhoff, 2008; Koppel, Wohl, Me-
ksin, & Hirst, 2014). However, in past research
participants are generally provided with cues
external to the narrative to help them assess
source credibility, either before or after they
have been provided with misinformation. These
cues may not be true reflections of source ac-
curacy in real world contexts (Echterhoff et al.,
2005; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). However,
when people can detect discrepancies between
their memory for an event and the misinforma-
tion presented, they are able to reject misinfor-
mation (Tousignant et al., 1986). In the present
study, we manipulated the amount of postevent
misinformation participants received to exam-
ine (a) the association between amount of mis-
information and susceptibility to misinforma-
tion, (b) whether increasing the proportion of
misinformation to neutral information would
impact perceived source credibility, (c) whether
perceptions of source credibility mediated the
misinformation-memory performance associa-
tion, (d) the relations between perceived source
credibility and source monitoring accuracy, and
(e) whether participants were able to accurately
assess their performance. Our results shed light
on human memory processes, including contex-
tual and individual difference predictors of re-
sistance to misinformation, and have important
implications for applied contexts such as in
clinical settings.
First, we found, unsurprisingly, that exposure
to more misinformation led participants to an-
swer a lower proportion of misinformation
questions correctly and a higher proportion of
misinformation questions in line with the pre-
sented misinformation. The high rates of misin-
formation may have burdened participants with
higher cognitive load as they struggled to mon-
itor the high rates of misinformation. This cog-
nitive load may have made them more vulner-
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able to the misinformation (Craik, Govoni,
Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996; Magliano
& Radvansky, 2001).
Critically, in line with our primary hypothe-
sis, an opposing pattern also emerged such that
exposure to higher rates of misinformation led
participants to be more skeptical of the accuracy
of the narrative, and this increased skepticism
led to an increase in resistance to misinforma-
tion. On average participants who received a
narrative with 80% misinformation answered
smaller proportions of questions about those
misinformation items correctly (i.e., they were
less accurate) than those who received 20%.
However, within each condition participants
performed best if they reported being skeptical
of the accuracy of the narrative. Participants
who were presented with higher levels of misin-
formation were most likely to be made skeptical,
and those who were made skeptical resisted a
greater proportion of presented misinformation.
Skepticism, both in terms of perceived credibil-
ity and narrative accuracy, was also associated
with increased source monitoring accuracy. This
association may have emerged in line with a
source monitoring perspective (Koppel et al.,
2014), and in line with previous research using
explicit warnings about source credibility (Echter-
hoff et al., 2005; Frost et al., 2002; Skagerberg &
Wright, 2009), such that those participants who
were distrustful of the misinformation source
more vigilantly monitored their memory to resist
misinformation. The opposite pattern of results
was also possible, such that participants who more
vigilantly monitored the narrative for misinforma-
tion better detected discrepancies between the
video and narrative and thus reported that the
narrative was of lower credibility and accuracy.
The directionality of this effect needs further ex-
ploration in future research.
Participants also demonstrated successful
metacognition in terms of estimating their cor-
rect and incorrect responses, but not their mis-
led responses. While participants tended to
slightly overestimate their accuracy, those who
gave more correct and fewer incorrect responses
correctly rated themselves as being more accu-
rate and as having stronger memories, and they
were more confident in their responses. Partic-
ipants who answered more memory questions
correctly were also better calibrated in their
performance estimates; however, the causal di-
rection of this relation is unclear. It may be that
all participants rated their performance simi-
larly in terms of accuracy regardless of actual
accuracy. If this were the case, estimates would
appear more calibrated for highly accurate par-
ticipants because on average, people estimated
that they were highly accurate. Or it may be that
participants who were more resistant to misin-
formation were also better able to estimate their
performance. The latter interpretation is in line
with research demonstrating that students who
perform well on examinations tend to be more
attuned to their own performance (see Fal-
chikov & Boud, 1989, for a review). Examina-
tion of the present confidence results might shed
some light on this. Specifically, subjective con-
fidence ratings were positively related to cor-
rectly responding and negatively related to incor-
rectly responding. Thus, it appears that
participants were at least somewhat attuned to
how well they remembered the information. In
line with previous research, participants appeared
unaware when they had incorporated misleading
information both in terms of their performance
estimates and subjective confidence ratings
(Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982; Loftus, Donders,
Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989; Luna & Migueles,
2009).
In summary, there appear to be two opposing
pathways linking misinformation to memory
accuracy: a direct path between provision of
misinformation and susceptibility to misinfor-
mation and an indirect path via perceptions of
source credibility. On the one hand, receiving
high proportions of misinformation negatively
impacted participants’ performance by increas-
ing susceptibility to misinformation. On the
other hand, when participants received more
misinformation, they were, on average, more
skeptical of the source of that misinformation,
and appropriately rated the narrative as contain-
ing fewer correct details and as being of lower
credibility. Critically, this skepticism about the
misinformation narrative was associated with
increased source monitoring accuracy and re-
sulted in a significantly diminished misinforma-
tion effect. Thus, this research demonstrates that
while provision of misinformation is undoubt-
edly detrimental to memory performance, indi-
viduals who are appropriately skeptical of the
accuracy of a misinformation source are par-
tially protected from memory errors.
Our work also has implications for clinical
contexts. For example, recovered-memory ther-
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apeutic techniques (RMTs) are those in which
therapists attempt to extract clients’ purportedly
“repressed” memories (Poole, Lindsay, Memon,
& Bull, 1995). Researchers have revealed that
RMTs can involve suggesting event elements
not previously mentioned by patients. More-
over, use of these types of techniques in re-
search settings increases the likelihood that in-
dividuals will incorporate false details into their
memories, or even unintentionally fabricate en-
tire false events (e.g., Hyman, Husband, & Bill-
ings, 1995; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). Thus,
RMT has been labeled a potentially harmful
psychological technique, both in terms of the
potential for memory distortion, and for the
mental health of clients (Lilienfeld, 2007).
However, according to a recent review article,
these techniques still “flourish” (Lynn, Evans,
Laurence, & Lilienfeld, 2015). In contrast, em-
pirically supported therapies focus on allowing
patients to report and interpret events using their
own words, with therapists offering assistance
in the deeper exploration and modification of
thoughts and feelings related to these experi-
ences, rather than the details of the remembered
experiences themselves (Lane, Ryan, Nadel, &
Greenberg, 2015). The present research high-
lights the importance of adhering to these latter
practices and avoiding making assumptions, or
suggesting additions or revisions to factual con-
tent in clinical contexts, particularly given that
clinicians are likely perceived as highly credible
information sources.
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